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Jewish Religious Divorce and American
Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study*
"Over him who divorces the wife of his youth,
even the altar of God sheds tears."'
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On August 8, 1983, New York Governor Mario Cuomo signed
into law a "removal of barriers to remarriage" statute which became
effective immediately thereafter. 2 Although ostensibly neutral on its
face, all concede the legislation is directed towards the problem of the
"agunah," a Jewish woman who is unable to obtain a Jewish religious
divorce (a "get") from her husband. 3 The New York statute is the
first American legislative attempt to remedy the plight of the agunah.
This Comment will consider both this latest legislative effort and the
previous judicial attempts to resolve the problem of the modern day
agunah in light of the traditional Jewish law (the "halakhah") and
modern American jurisprudence.
The halakhah, of course, can have no legal effect on the civil
status of married persons. A woman who is unable to secure a get
from her husband has no barrier to civil remarriage other than ob-
taining a valid decree of secular divorce. However, the halakhah
* A version of this Comment was awarded the 1985 Harold and Celine Easton
Scholarship Award on the Relationship Between Rabbinic Law and Anglo-American Law,
sponsored by the University of Judaism.
1. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nashim: Tractate Gittin 90b.
2. Act of Aug. 8, 1983, ch. 979, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1904-05, amended by Act of Aug. 6,
1984, ch. 945, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2660-62 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney
Supp. 1984)). The full text of the statute as revised is contained infra in Appendix A.
3. In his memorandum approving the bill, Governor Cuomo stated that "It]he bill
solves a problem created by the interrelation of Jewish law and New York Civil Law. Tradi-
tional Jewish law does not regard a secular divorce as sufficient to dissolve a marriage. It
requires that the husband give the wife a document referred to as a 'get.'" 1983 N.Y. Laws
2818, 2819.
Courts and commentators alike refer to the legislation as the "get statute." See generally
1983 Survey of New York Law, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 200-01, 391-93 (1984); Warmflash,
The New York Approach To Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur To The Get
Statute, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 229 (1984); Chambers v. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471
N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 1983) (referring to the "Avitzur" or "get"
statute).
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takes a far stricter view of divorce and the requirements for a valid
dissolution than the common law.
As with all Jewish law, the concept of divorce stems from
Scripture:
When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to
pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some
unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement,
and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house.4
The "bill of divorcement," handed from the husband to his wife, is
called a get. A wife may not give a get to her husband; the verse is not
gender neutral. Absent the delivery of a get to a wife by her husband,
the halakhah recognizes no divorce.
Because Jewish marriages are governed by a private contract be-
tween the husband and wife known as a "ketubah," under Jewish law
a divorce may be achieved only through an act of the marital parties.
A halakhic court (a "Beth Din") cannot dissolve a marriage by de-
cree. Thus, the dissolution of marriage by divorce under the
halakhah differs fundamentally from its counterpart in the Anglo-
American common law: halakhic marriages may be dissolved only
through an act of the marital partners, whereas civil marriages are
dissolved only by the decree of a court. 5 A Beth Din may decide
whether and on what terms a get should be given or received, and
may also supervise the drafting of the document to ensure the com-
plex procedural requirements for a valid get are followed.6 But, even
where the court independently believes a divorce is warranted, the
husband must still deliver a get to his wife before the halakhah recog-
nizes a valid religious divorce. Secular decrees of divorce are
irrelevant.
It is the wife who suffers the most without a get in hand.
Although she may be possessed of a valid secular divorce, under the
halakhah she is still considered to be "chained" or "tied" to her hus-
band and thus forbidden to remarry. Such a woman is an agunah.
Should an agunah ever remarry, any children of the second marriage
are presumptively bastards and are prohibited from ever marrying
other Jews,7 although the subsequent issue of the former husband fall
4. Deuteronomy 24:1.
5. I. KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 467 (1979).
6. Id.
7. "A bastard shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord; even to the tenth generation
shall none of his enter into the assembly of the Lord." Deuteronomy 23:3.
Bastards under Jewish law also differ from their common law counterparts. Under the
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under no such proscription.
The problem is compounded in that a Beth Din is powerless to
compel a reluctant husband to deliver a get to his waiting wife.8 If the
wife never receives her get, either through the negligence, incapacity,
or willful refusal of her husband, she remains an agunah for life.
Against this background, modem American judicial and legisla-
tive bodies have struggled to solve the problem of the Jewish agunah.
Doubtless because of its large observant Jewish population, the vast
majority of these efforts have taken place in New York. Thus, this
Comment will first survey the American common law approaches to
the agunah with particular emphasis on the New York decisions, ana-
lyze the response of the New York Legislature, and finally consider
other possible halakhic solutions to the problem.
II. NEW YORK CASE LAW
Over the past thirty years, the New York courts have had several
opportunities to consider this problem. To trace the evolution of the
modem law, each case is examined briefly.
A. Koeppel v. Koeppel
The New York courts first encountered the agunah in 1954. In
Koeppel v. Koeppel,9 the parties had prepared and agreed to a separa-
tion agreement that would become effective immediately upon the
successful conclusion of the wife's suit for annulment.10 The agree-
ment contained a provision whereby the Koeppels expressly promised
that they would, "whenever called upon and if and whenever the
same shall become necessary, appear before a Rabbi. . . and execute
any and all papers and documents required by and necessary to effec-
tuate a dissolution of their marriage" under Jewish law.I
The matter came to trial and the marriage was dissolved.
Although the husband did not appeal the judgment, he subsequently
halakhah, a bastard is not a child born out of wedlock, but a child born of an unlawful, inces-
tuous, or adulterous marriage. I. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 437 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even
Ha Ezer 4:13; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nashim: Tractate Yebamoth 49a; MISHNAH, Or-
der Nashim" Tractate Kiddushin 3:12). The children of a woman who remarries without a get
in hand would thus be issue of an adulterous marriage.
8. "A get given under compulsion is invalid." BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nashin:
Tractate Gittin 88b.
9. 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1954).
10. Id. at 369.
11. Id. at 370.
1984] 353
354 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 7:351
refused to appear before a rabbi or deliver a get to his wife despite
repeated demands for him to do so. The wife finally brought an equi-
table action to compel specific performance of the settlement
agreement. 12
Before trial the husband moved for summary judgment, contend-
ing, inter alia, that an order by a state court compelling him to appear
before a rabbi would "interfere with his freedom of religion under the
[federal] Constitution."' 3 Dismissing this contention and ordering a
trial on the merits, the appellate court concluded that "[c]omplying
with his agreement would not compel the defendant to practice any
religion, not even the Jewish faith to which he still admits adher-
ence." 14 The court continued: "[h]is appearance before the Rabbinate
to answer questions and give evidence needed by them to make a deci-
sion is not a profession of faith. Specific performance herein would
merely require the defendant to do what he voluntarily agreed to do."15
Mrs. Koeppel was thus entitled to a trial. Her complaint, how-
ever, was later dismissed by the trial referee, apparently as moot, in a
decision affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court.16 Mrs. Koeppel had already remarried in a ceremony at which
a rabbi had officiated.' 7 In dismissing the action, both the trial and
appellate courts relied on the specific language of the settlement
agreement in which the husband agreed to appear before a rabbi and
deliver a get "if and whenever the same shall become necessary.' 8
From the record, neither court was able to determine that specific
performance was "necessary."' 9 The court stated it was "unable to
12. Id.
13. Id. at 373.
14. Id.
15. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court based its holding on the fact that there was
already a voluntary agreement, a contract, to deliver a get.
The court was unimpressed by the husband's complaint that a get proceeding could be
overly time-consuming, and displayed particular sensitivity towards the agunah:
Defendant's statement that the ceremony before the Rabbinate takes from two to two
and one-half hours is not worthy of discussion. That is not much out of a lifetime,
especially if it will bring peace of mind and conscience to one whom defendant must at
one time have loved.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Koeppel v. Koeppel, 3 A.D.2d 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1957). The Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court is an intermediate level court; the state's highest
court is the New York Court of Appeals.
17. Id. at 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
18. Id.
19. Id., 161 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96. Evidently, the rabbi who officiated at Mrs. Koeppel's
second marriage did not require Mrs. Koeppel to obtain a get prior to remarriage. See Ellen-
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determine from the terms of the contract and the evidence adduced[ ]
what circumstances the parties intended to be sufficient to establish
the necessity of the dissolution of their marriage in accordance with
Jewish ecclesiastical law," and concluded that "[s]tanding alone, the
agreement is too indefinite to support a judgment of specific
performance.
'20
The Appellate Division thus dismissed the action because no ne-
cessity was shown-not because the court believed it lacked the power
or jurisdiction to compel the defendant to deliver a get. The court
merely stated that the record reflected insufficient evidence to support
the showing of necessity required by the agreement,21 and properly
refused to undertake its own independent halakhic determination as
to whether the requisite necessity existed.
22
Thus, the net result may have been due only to insufficient plead-
ing. Despite its outcome, Koeppel does not stand for the proposition
that a state court is without the power to enforce a "get provision"
when one is agreed to by the parties.
B. Margulies v. Margulies
The issue remained quiescent until 1973 with the advent of Mar-
gulies v. Margulies.23 The Margulies' marriage had been dissolved by
secular divorce in June of 1970.24 Shortly thereafter, disputes be-
tween the parties arose as to visitation rights and the division of cer-
tain personal property. These disputes were "ostensibly settled"
son & Ellenson, American Courts and the Enforceability of a Ketubah as a Private Contract: An
Investigation of Recent US. Court Decisions, CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM, Spring 1982, at 35, 37
(suggesting the rabbi was a member of the more liberal Reform movement of Judaism). See
also infra note 120 and accompanying text.
20. 3 A.D.2d at 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
21. Id.
22. The court was evidently aware, however, of at least some of the halakhic necessity for
a get:
The evidence discloses that appellant has been remarried at a ceremony at which a
duly ordained rabbi of her own faith officiated, and no question is raised as to the
validity of that marriage under the laws of this State, nor does it appear that its
validity has been otherwise questioned to appellant's detriment, or that there are
children of the second marriage.
Id., 161 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
Had there been children of the second marriage, presumptively bastards under the
halakhah, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, the court may possibly have found the
requisite necessity.
23. 42 A.D.2d 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 33
N.Y.2d 894, 307 N.E.2d 562, 352 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1973).
24. Id. at 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
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through stipulations made in open court, including a voluntary prom-
ise by the husband to "appear before a Rabbi. . .for the purposes of
a Jewish religious divorce."
'25
Later, the husband refused to fulfill this obligation. Seeking to
enforce the stipulation, the court twice held the husband in contempt,
each time levying a fine against him and ordering him to appear
before a rabbi. Still the husband refused, and the court finally ordered
him jailed for fifteen days. The husband appealed from the incarcera-
tion order. 26
The appellate court agreed that incarceration was improper, but
let stand the fines imposed by the trial court subject to the condition
that the husband be able to purge the contempt by participating in a
get ceremony." Though the opinion might be interpreted to suggest a
state court is without the power to enforce a directive to deliver a
get,28 the dissenting opinion infers the majority believed the lower
court order was enforceable. 29 The case best stands for the proposi-
tion that a defendant may be fined, but not jailed, for failure to com-
ply with an order to issue a get.30
Of particular interest are the dissent's convictions that a "He-
brew divorce has no validity unless the husband's consent is given
voluntarily and without coercion or duress," and that "[h]ad defend-
ant appeared and given his consent to the 'get' under threat of impris-
onment, the religious divorce thus obtained would have been a
nullity. '31 These arguments overlook the fact that the husband had
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The majority opinion stated that the "(d]efendant failed to perfect any appeals from
the prior orders .. .nor did he obtain a stay of the provisions contained in those orders,"
implying that had appeals been taken, they might have been successful. Id. The court's hold-
ing may also have been based solely on the defendant's petulant behavior in flouting the court's
authority or attempting to use legal process for ulterior motives. See id. at 518, 344 N.Y.S.2d
at 485.
29. The dissenting judge believed the order directing the husband to appear before a rabbi
was unenforceable, and that the motion to punish, granted by the majority, should have been
denied. Id. (Nunez, J., dissenting).
30. Although the court did not explain this distinction, one explanation consonant with
the facts and holding of Margulies is that the judges did not wish to allow the husband to
purge his contempt merely through a civil commitment of fifteen days, but wished instead to
compel the husband to perform his agreement. "The [appellate court] refused to let stand the
[trial court's] exercise of its [contempt] power in order to compel the husband to perform his
agreement, i.e., to participate in a Jewish divorce." Pal v. Pal, 45 A.D.2d 738, 740, 356
N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (2d Dep't 1974) (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
31. 42 A.D.2d at 518, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (Nunez, J., dissenting) (citing 3 UNIVERSAL
356 [Vol. 7:351
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already voluntarily agreed to appear before a rabbi to issue a get, and
thus was only being required to do something to which he had already
agreed. 32
C. Rubin v. Rubin
A slightly different situation faced the court in Rubin v. Rubin, 33
where it was the wife who refused to accept a get in violation of a
separation agreement. The Rubins were divorced in 1961 by decree of
an Alabama court.3 4 In 1972, proceedings were instituted in New
York to enforce the 1961 agreement, but were later dropped when the
parties reached a new accord. Although the new agreement specifi-
cally called for both parties to cooperate in securing a get, the wife
subsequently refused to receive the instrument.35
The next year the wife brought a second action praying that the
original Alabama decree be enforced. In that action, the court
awarded her a consent order specifying monthly support payments
and the payment of arrears with the "understanding" she would "co-
operate" in securing a get.36 Upon the failure of the husband to com-
ply with the terms of the latest settlement, the wife instituted yet an-
other action, even though she herself had refused to appear before the
rabbinical court for the get.3 7
The Family Court first vacated the 1973 agreement because the
condition precedent to its enforcement-the wife's cooperation in se-
curing a get-had failed, and "rolled back" the proceedings to the
1972 agreement.38 Stating that "[tihe courts of this State have recog-
JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 578 (1948) and 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 130 (1971)). The judge's
halakhic analysis was criticized in Ellenson & Ellenson, supra note 19, at 38. The Ellensons
also note the dissenting judge first offered his interpretation of substantive Jewish law, but then
concluded that religious law was not a legitimate concern for a secular court under the first
amendment. Id.
32. Thus, these facts may be distinguished from the situation in which a secular court
attempts to force an unwilling husband to issue a get in the first instance. See infra notes 117-
18 and accompanying text.
33. 75 Misc. 2d 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fan. Ct. 1973).
34. Id. at 778, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id., 348 N.Y.S.2d at 64. Cf. Pal v. Pal, 45 A.D.2d 738, 739, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673
(2d Dep't 1974) (motion for contempt denied for want of clean hands). Pal, of course, had not
yet been decided. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
38. 75 Misc. 2d at 783, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
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nized the validity of an agreement to obtain a Get,"' 39 the court or-
dered the husband to consult a rabbi for the purpose of securing the
get, and conditioned further enforcement of the 1972 agreement upon
the wife's acceptance of it.40 Should the wife refuse the get, the court
ordered her petition be dismissed on the merits. 41 The Rubin case
thus extended the recognized power of the court to compel a husband
to deliver a get pursuant to an agreement to also compel a wife to
accept a get.
D. Pal v. Pal
The enforceability of a get provision arose once again in Pal v.
Pal.42 In Pal, the parties stipulated in open court that they would
"submit themselves to a Rabbinical Tribunal on the question of
whether the [husband] shall be directed to take all steps necessary to
grant a Jewish divorce. ' 43 The stipulation and order also provided
that the court could select a rabbi to choose the members of the tribu-
nal should the parties fail to agree on its composition."
While the matter was pending before the parties' tribunal, the
husband claimed the wife had deprived him of his visitation rights.
Thereafter, a rabbi withdrew from the tribunal and the wife moved
the court to appoint another rabbi pursuant to the agreement.45 Over
a strong dissent, the reviewing court summarily held the trial court
"had no authority to, in effect, convene a rabbinical tribunal. '46
The dissent argued that far from convening a rabbinical tribunal,
the trial court had simply attempted to enforce a voluntary agreement
between the parties, and the court's appointment of a rabbi was akin
to the appointment of a skilled arbitrator.47 As the stipulation and
order only required the parties to appear before a rabbinical tribunal
on the question of whether the husband should deliver a get, and not
to compel such delivery, the dissent concluded that appellate courts
"should not anticipate or speculate as to the religious consequences of
39. Id. at 782, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 67 (citing Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup.
Ct., Queens Co. 1954)).
40. Id. at 783, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
41. Id. at 783-84, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68. A decision on the merits would invoke res judicata
and end the litigation.
42. 45 A.D.2d 738, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974)
43. Id. at 739, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 739, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
47. Id. at 740, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
358 [Vol. 7:351
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[a] mere appearance and participation before a rabbinical tribunal. ' '48
Although perhaps decided incorrectly for the reasons stated in
the dissent, Pal nevertheless circumscribes further limits around the
enforceability of a stipulation to appear before a Beth Din: such a stip-
ulation may be enforced, but apparently only so long as the court
remains clear of the actual process.
E. Waxstein v. Waxstein
In Waxstein v. Waxstein, 49 the court was again faced with a hus-
band who had agreed to deliver a get to his wife but failed to do so. In
1973, the Waxsteins executed a separation agreement containing a
provision that the parties would obtain a get. Upon the husband's
failure to deliver the get, the wife instituted proceedings to compel
specific performance of the agreement. 50
The husband argued that a court is powerless to compel a spouse
to obtain a get, citing the earlier decisions in Margulies and Pal.51
Rejecting this argument and distinguishing the cited cases, the court
concluded it could order specific performance of a contractual obliga-
tion to obtain a get and, further, could condition enforcement of other
separation provisions on the delivery of the get.52 Waxstein is particu-
larly noteworthy in that it regards the power of a court to order en-
forcement of a get provision as settled law. Curiously, Waxstein was
affirmed per curiam by the same department of the Appellate Division
that had reversed Pal 53 three years earlier.
F Shapiro v. Shapiro
An interesting expansion of the court's power appeared in Sha-
piro v. Shapiro.54 The Shapiros were married in France in 1959, and
subsequently moved to Israel. 55 In 1962, the wife moved the Israeli
Rabbinical Court for a hearing as to her marriage, at which the par-
48. Id., 356 N.Y.S.2d at 675 (Martusceflo, J., dissenting).
49. 90 Misc. 2d 784, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1976), affd per curiam, 57
A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dep't 1977).
50. Id. at 785, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
51. Id. at 787, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
52. Id. at 789, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
53. 45 A.D.2d 738, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dep't 1977). See supra notes 42-48 and accom-
panying text.
54. 110 Misc. 2d 726, 442 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1981), affid, 88 A.D.2d 592,
449 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1983).
55. Id. at 726, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
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ties agreed to a six-month trial separation. 56 After the six-month pe-
riod had elapsed, the wife renewed her request for a divorce. Shortly
thereafter, the husband fled Israel, leaving his wife and two infant
children unsupported, eventually settling in New York. In 1979, sev-
enteen years after the initial hearing, the Rabbinical Court issued an
order directing the husband, in absentia, to deliver a get to his wife.
57
The wife, still a resident of Israel, sued for divorce in the United
States, and asked the court to treat the 1979 Rabbinical Court decree
as a New York decree. After reviewing authorities relating to the
recognition of foreign judgments and the doctrine of comity, the court
recognized the Israeli order and agreed to enforce the directives
therein, specifically ordering the husband to "schedule an appoint-
ment with the Rabbinical Council of America and . . . perform all
the ritual acts of the 'get' ceremony.158 The court thus ordered the
husband to deliver a get without resort to a previous voluntary agree-
ment such as a separation agreement or other contract to do so.
G. Avitzur v. Avitzur
Up to this point, the New York courts had little difficulty enforc-
ing provisions of separation agreements or other contracts calling for
a spouse to give or receive a get. In Avitzur v. Avitzur,59 New York's
highest court considered the issue of the enforceability of a slightly
different provision contained not in a separation agreement, but in the
ketubah, the ritual contract of marriage.
The parties in Avitzur were married in 1966, and, in accordance
with the halakhah, signed both a Hebrew/Aramaic and an English
version of their marriage ketubah.6° The ketubah contained a clause
which stated:
[W]e, the bride and bridegroom ... hereby agree to recognize the
Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly ... as having authority to
counsel us in the light of Jewish tradition which requires husband
and wife to. . .summon either party at the request of the other, in
order to enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with
the standards of the Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her
56. Id., 442 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The Israeli Rabbinical Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters of domestic relations. Id., 442 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29. See also I. KLEIN, supra note 5,
at 467.
57. 110 Misc. 2d at 727, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
58. Id. at 731, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
59. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 76 (1983).
60. Id. at 111, 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
[Vol. 7:351
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lifetime.61
After the marriage was dissolved in 1978, the husband refused to
either appear before the Beth Din or deliver a get to his former wife.
The wife subsequently brought an action requesting that the secular
court grant specific performance of the ketubah clause.62 The hus-
band moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that "any grant of relief
to [the wife] would involve the civil court in impermissible considera-
tion of a purely religious matter.
'63
The trial court denied the husband's motion to dismiss, reasoning
that "the relief sought could be granted without impermissible judi-
cial entanglement in any doctrinal issue." 64 The Appellate Division
reversed on appeal, holding that the state, having already granted the
parties a civil divorce, had no further interest in their marital status
and thus the ketubah, a religious contract of marriage, was unenforce-
able by a secular court.65
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding
that nothing in law or public policy prevents the judicial recognition
and enforcement of the secular terms of a ketubah.66 "[T]he provi-
sions of the Ketubah. . .constitute nothing more than an agreement
to refer the matter. . . to a nonjudicial forum."' 67 The court specifi-
cally noted that by deciding the case before it "solely upon the appli-
cation of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to any
religious principle, ' 6 the judicial enforcement of the ketubah would
be consistent with the first amendment "neutral principles of law"
standards recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court.69
However, the court was careful to limit its holding to the facts
before it, and noted that Mrs. Avitzur was "not attempting to compel
61. Id. at 112, 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The clause is a recent addition to
the Conservative ketubah by Professor Saul Lieberman in a rabbinical attempt to solve the
problem of the agunah by imposing a civil obligation on the recalcitrant husband to appear
before a Beth Din. The clause is apparently not included in Orthodox ketubot. I. KLEIN,
supra note 5, at 393-94. See infra text accompanying note 132.
62. 58 N.Y.2d at 112, 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
63. Id. at 112-13, 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
64. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
65. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573-74.
66. Id. at 111, 446 N.E.2d at 136-37, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
67. Id. at 113-14, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
68. Id. at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
69. Id. In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), the Court held that a state court may
adopt any approach to resolving a religious dispute which does not entail consideration of
doctrinal matters, such as the application of well-established principles of secular real property
or contract law to the dispute. Id. at 602-03.
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defendant to obtain a Get or to enforce a religious practice arising
solely out of principles of religious law."'70 Moreover, the court ob-
served that "nothing the Beth Din can do would in any way affect the
civil divorce.
'71
Even so, the court in Avitzur was closely divided four-to-three.
The dissent argued "that to grant the relief plaintiff seeks in this ac-
tion, even to the limited extent contemplated by the majority, would
necessarily violate the constitutional prohibition against entanglement
of our secular courts in matters of religious and ecclesiastical con-
tent."' 72 In support, the dissent contended the ketubah at issue was
"indisputably in its essence a document prepared and executed under
Jewish law and tradition"; 73 that no secular obligations could be
"fractured" out of the ketubah;7 4 and that any action to enforce the
provisions of the ketubah would necessarily involve a detailed exami-
nation of the underlying Jewish law and tradition.7 5 However, these
arguments overlook the fact that although a ketubah may indeed be
"in its essence" a document prepared under Jewish law and tradition,
in the eyes of the law it should be no more than a civil antenuptial
contract between the parties to the marriage. Just as a court may
order specific enforcement of any contract when the alternative dam-
age remedy at law is inadequate, the religiously undisputed terms con-
tained in a ketubah should be specifically enforceable by a secular
court.
III. OTHER CASE LAW
In addition to New York, two other jurisdictions have addressed
the problem of the agunah with varying results.
In 1966, Florida's intermediate appellate court summarily struck
a provision in a divorce decree which required a husband to "cooper-
ate with [the wife] in obtaining a Jewish divorce."' 76 The court held
that the trial judge had exceeded his authority because it was "appar-
ent" his order required the husband to "submit to a religious cere-
70. 58 N.Y.2d at 113, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
71. Id. at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
72. Id. at 116, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Jones, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 120, 446 N.E.2d at 142, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78 (Jones, J., dissenting).
76. Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (3d Dist. Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233
(Fla. 1967).
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mony in which he will be required to take an active part."'77
Although New York's Koeppel opinion had already been handed
down, the Florida court cited neither it nor any other authority to
support its position. Florida has not yet reconsidered the issue.
On the other hand, New Jersey recently considered the issue in
Minkin v. Minkin,78 where the court concluded it could order specific
performance of a ketubah without infringing upon the husband's con-
stitutional rights. 79 In Minkin, the plaintiff-wife had moved the court
for an order compelling her husband to pay for and deliver to her a
get based on a provision of the marriage ketubah. Relying upon the
expert testimony of four rabbis, and citing the New York decisions in
Koeppel and Rubin, the court held a ketubah to be a civil, not reli-
gious, document,80 and ordered the husband to deliver the get.
Minkin is especially noteworthy in that the court ordered the
husband to obtain a get based solely upon the ketubah some two years
before the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Avitzur was
handed down.
While the results in these two states are by no means indicative
of the results in other jurisdictions, courts that analyze the issue in
depth and consider the New York and New Jersey precedents are
more likely to be persuaded by those decisions than the summary
Florida opinion. By merely enforcing a previous voluntary agreement
contained in a ketubah or other agreement, those courts have estab-
lished a system of relief for the agunah which is both inoffensive to the
first amendment and valid under the halakhah.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
New York courts have recognized the ketubah as a private con-
tract which may be enforced by a secular court when neutral princi-
ples of contract law are used and to the extent that no religious
principles are involved. Thus, a ketubah that contains an agreement
to submit to the jurisdiction of a Beth Din may be enforced by an
order of a state court. Earlier New York cases held that a separation
agreement containing a provision for the husband (or wife) to partici-
pate in the get ritual may also be enforced, although a state court is
without the power to jail an unwilling party or to "convene a
77. Id. at 788.
78. 180 N.J. Super. 260, 434 A.2d 665 (1981).
79. Id. at 266, 434 A.2d at 668.
80. Id.
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rabbinical tribunal" in order to do so. A court may, however, condi-
tion the enforceability of an agreement's remaining provisions on the
delivery and acceptance of a get or impose continuing fines for
noncompliance.
Still, the question of whether a court could simply order a hus-
band to tender a get in the absence of an existing contractual obliga-
tion remained unanswered. The New York Legislature addressed this
issue in 1983 by enacting a new section to the New York Domestic
Relations Law obliquely entitled "Removal of barriers to
remarriage."8
1
A. Provisions Of The Get Statute
Essentially the new law requires a plaintiff to file and serve a
sworn statement that either "to the best of his or her knowledge, he or
she has[] . . .taken all steps solely within his or her power to remove
all barriers to the defendant's remarriage," or "that the defendant has
waived in writing the requirements" of the law as a condition prece-
dent to the entry of a final judgment of divorce or annulment.
8 2
Notwithstanding the filing of such a statement, however, the law also
provides that the entry of a final judgment may be withheld when the
"clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage" files a
sworn statement indicating that "to his or her knowledge" all of the
possible steps were not taken.8 3 The statute applies to any divorce or
annulment action brought in New York,84 wherever solemnized by a
clergyman or minister,8 5 and further provides that any person who
knowingly submits a false sworn statement will be punished in ac-
cordance with the New York penal law.
8 6
Although perhaps well-intentioned, the statute arguably violates
both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amend-
81. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1984). See supra notes 2-3 and ac-
companying text.
The statute was amended in 1984. Act of Aug. 6, 1984, ch. 945, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2660-62.
The full text of the revised statute is contained infra in Appendix A.
82. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984). Both parties are required
to file statements in an uncontested action. Id. § 253(4).
83. Id. § 253(7).
84. Id. § 253(2).
85. Id. § 253(1).
86. Id. § 253(8). Section 210.40 of the New York Penal Law provides that making "an
apparently sworn false statement in the first degree is a class E felony," N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 210.40 (McKinney 1984), punishable by imprisonment not to exceed four years. Id. § 70(1),
(2)(e), (4).
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ment, the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, and the contracts clause of article I, section 10.87 In-
deed, Governor Cuomo acknowledged possible constitutional infir-
mity when he signed the legislation.88 In addition to constitutional
concerns, the statute may be ineffective or have unintentional effects
in some cases merely by virtue of the facts surrounding the dissolution
proceeding or through astute tactical maneuvering by a party.8 9 Fi-
nally, the validity of a get compelled by the statute is questionable
under the halakhah. These objections are analyzed briefly below.
B. Constitutional Validity
From the outset, the statute has been sharply criticized on consti-
tutional grounds, especially as being repugnant to the religious free-
dom guarantees of the first amendmentP° The first amendment
grounds are two-fold.
1. Establishment clause considerations
The establishment clause of the first amendment, applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, 91 essentially prohibits government sponsorship or active in-
volvement in religious activities. 92 Over the years, the Supreme Court
has developed a tripartite test for determining whether legislation can
withstand scrutiny under the establishment clause: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
87. The statute has already been held partially void under the contracts clause. Cham-
bers v. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1983). See infra
notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
88. "If there is a constitutional impediment, I am sure our excellent courts will make that
clear in due time." 1983 N.Y. Laws 2818, 2819.
89. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Warmflash, supra note 3, at 250-53. See also Kochen, Constitutional
Implications Of New York's 'Get' Statute, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2. In rebuttal,
arguments for the statute's constitutionality have been published by its draftsman. Lewin, The
Constitutional Validity Of New York's 'Get' Statute, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
The first amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
91. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
92. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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ment with religion.' ,,93 Assuming arguendo the get statute advances
the secular legislative purpose of encouraging remarriage by removing
any barriers thereto, the statute may nonetheless fall short of the con-
stitutional mark.
The statute arguably violates both the second and third parts of
the Court's establishment test in that subdivision seven allows a cler-
gyman or minister to effectively block a secular dissolution proceed-
ing by certifying that "to his or her knowledge," all steps within the
sole power of the plaintiff to remove any barriers to the defendant's
remarriage have not been taken. 94 "Barriers to remarriage" are de-
fined to include "without limitation, any religious or conscientious re-
straint or inhibition. . . imposed. . . under the principles held by the
clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage."95 Because
independent consideration of the principles held by the clergyman, or
even of the truth of his statement, appear to be foreclosed by subdivi-
sion nine of the statute, 96 the clergyman is afforded almost unlimited
power to block the decree.
Invalidating a Massachusetts statute that afforded churches and
schools the power to block applications for liquor licenses under the
primary effect test, the Supreme Court stated that even the "mere ap-
pearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and
State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion. . . by reason
of the power conferred."'97 Presumably a joint exercise of judicial au-
thority by church and state would be similarly proscribed. In that
event, the New York law may have an impermissible primary, albeit
unintentional, effect of advancing religion under the Court's most re-
cent application of the primary effect test.
In the same case, the Court also considered the "entanglement
implications of a statute vesting significant governmental authority in
93. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citing Board of Education v. Al-
len, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
94. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(7) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
95. Id. § 253(6) (emphasis added).
96. "Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court to inquire into or
determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The truth of any statement submitted pursuant
to this section shall not be the subject of any judicial inquiry .... " Id. § 253(9). Subdivision
nine was enacted as part of a 1984 amendment to the law, presumably to reduce perceived first
amendment objections to the law as originally drafted. See supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
97. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982). See also Warmflash,
supra note 3, at 252 (criticizing statute on second test); Kochen, supra note 90, at 32, col. 2
(same). This argument was ostensibly refuted in Lewin, supra note 90, at 2, col. 3.
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churches. ' 98 Reiterating the "core rationale" underlying the estab-
lishment clause, the Court concluded the "Framers did not set up a
system of government in which important, discretionary governmen-
tal powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institu-
tions." 99 Again analogizing judicial power to governmental power,
the statute may create a system in which an important discretionary
judicial function-the power to grant or block decrees of civil di-
vorce-may be unintentionally shared with an agent of a religious
institution.
Moreover, the statute does not appear to contain a "reset"
clause. Thus, once a clergyman or minister files a statement which
has the effect of blocking the entry of a final judgment of divorce or
annulment, strict interpretation of the statute does not allow entry of
the judgment even if the parties subsequently remedy the source of
the clergyman's objection.
Considering the New York law under the tests outlined by the
Supreme Court, it seems plain a court could reasonably find the stat-
ute fails the establishment provision of the first amendment.
2. Free exercise implications
The statute may also violate the free exercise clause of the first
amendment by conditioning the entry of a final judgment upon a liti-
gant's participation in an essentially religious ritual. Also applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 1°° the free exercise
clause absolutely prohibits governmental interference with any reli-
gious belief or citizen's wish to practice any religion. Conversely, the
clause also protects an individual's right to not hold any religious be-
lief or be forced to participate in any religious practice or ritual what-
soever. Invalidating a 1981 statute authorizing a one minute period of
silence in all Alabama public schools "for meditation or voluntary
prayer," the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces
the right to select any religious faith or none at all." °1
Although on its face the statute merely requires a plaintiff to file
and serve a sworn statement, before such a statement can be honestly
98. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126.
99. Id. at 126-27.
100. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
101. Wallace v. Jaffree, 53 U.S.L.W. 4665, 4669 (1985) (emphasis added). See also Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (government can neither force a person to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion nor compel the affirmation of a belief that God exists).
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made the plaintiff may be required to engage in a purely religious act.
Thus, the New York statute may interfere with an individual's consti-
tutionally protected right to be free of all religious practices by requir-
ing an affirmative religious act of one who may not wish to participate
therein. While a secular court may arguably enforce a previous vol-
untary agreement to submit to a religious tribunal, unlike a court or-
der enforcing a previous commitment, the statute seeks to impose far
more on the reluctant party in the first instance.
3. Equal protection considerations
Because the law appears to be specifically tailored towards Or-
thodox and perhaps Conservative Jews to the exclusion of other reli-
gions, the statute is suspect on fourteenth amendment equal
protection as well as first amendment freedom of religion grounds.
Since 1938, the Supreme Court has applied a "strict scrutiny"
equal protection analysis to any legislation that distinguishes between
persons in terms of any "fundamental right," including the freedom
of religion guarantees of the first amendment. 10 2 In order for the stat-
ute to withstand an equal protection challenge, New York must
demonstrate both that the law is "closely fitted" to further a "compel-
ling" state interest which is advanced by the statute, and that there
102. The seminal case was United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in
which Justice Stone suggested "Itihere may be narrower scope for operation of the presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Id. at 152 n.4. Both freedom of
religion clauses have been held to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See supra
notes 91 & 100.
The Court recently reaffirmed the application of strict scrutiny to legislation which dis-
criminates among religious groups. Invalidating Minnesota's "fifty per cent rule" which im-
posed certain registration and reporting requirements only upon religious organizations which
solicit over one-half of their funds from non-members, the Court in Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 246 (1982), noted that "[i]n short, when we are presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that
we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." The Court went on to state that
"the Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all
religions, and not to provisions. . . that discriminate among religions." Id. at 252 (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).
The legislative history of the fifty per cent rule in Minnesota clearly indicated the law was
carefully tailored to apply to some religions but not to others-essentially a form of "religious
gerrymandering." Id. at 254-55 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
Given the explicit legislative history of the New York statute, especially the Governor's com-
ments upon signing the bill, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, an analogy between the
instant situation and that presented in Larson may be easily drawn.
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are no less constitutionally burdensome alternatives available to
achieve that interest.
On its face, the statute is applicable to all marriages solemnized
in New York or elsewhere by a clergyman or minister.1°3 However,
subdivision six of the law states that " '[a]ll steps solely within his or
her power' [of the plaintiff to remove barriers to the defendant's re-
marriage] shall not be construed to include application to a marriage
tribunal. . . of a religious denomination which has authority to an-
nul or dissolve a marriage," and therefore concentrates the effect of
the statute on eliminating only those barriers to remarriage that can
be dissolved through the "voluntary" acts of a party. 1°4 Thus, for
example, Catholics, who are unable to dissolve a marriage through
the unilateral act of one party, appear specifically exempted from the
requirements of the law. The statute unquestionably targets followers
of Jewish religious practice.
The statute may even discriminate between observant and non-
observant Jews. Because the barriers to remarriage are defined by the
principles held by the clergyman or minister who solemnized the mar-
riage,10 5 the statute may be of little avail to a Jewish plaintiff-mar-
ried by a Reform rabbi who personally does not recognize the
necessity of a get for remarriage-who nonetheless now desires a get.
Assuming arguendo that New York could demonstrate the re-
moval of religious barriers to remarriage constitutes a "compelling"
state interest, it is unlikely that this statute, even as revised, could
withstand a constitutional equal protection attack under the strict
scrutiny standard of review.
4. Contracts clause implications
Finally, one subdivision of the statute was unexpectedly declared
an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations shortly af-
ter its enactment in Chambers v. Chambers.1°6
In Chambers, the parties had entered into a separation agreement
103. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
104. Id. § 253(6). To remove all doubt, the statute also states that "[ilt shall not be
deemed a 'barrier to remarriage' within the meaning of this section if the restraint or inhibition
cannot be removed by the party's voluntary act." Id. See also Kochen, supra note 90, at 32,
col. 2.
105. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(6) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
106. 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1983).
Article I of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that "No State shall. . . pass any
• . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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before the effective date of the get statute, but found entry of their
final judgment blocked for want of a "removal of barriers" statement
by the husband. The husband had made a general appearance at the
divorce proceedings but did not contest the action. 10 7 Because the
statute applies to cases commenced before its effective date, and re-
quires both parties to file statements in an uncontested divorce, the
entry of the Chambers' divorce was blocked. 108
After questioning the constitutionality of the statute on various
grounds,10 9 the court concluded that inasmuch as the "judicial reme-
dies available to parties to a contract at the time of its making are part
of the constitutionally protected obligations of contracts," the statute
was void as applied because it impaired the judicial remedies available
(i.e., the decree of divorce) to the parties when their separation agree-
ment was executed." 1 No appeal was taken from this decision.
C. Factual and Tactical Considerations
Several situations are easily imagined in which the legislation is
powerless to help the agunah and may even work unforeseen mischief.
First, because the statute applies only to marriages solemnized by a
clergyman, minister, or ethical culture leader,"' it is inapplicable to
couples who were married by a civil official such as a judge or mayor.
Thus, the law offers little recourse to the plaintiff with after-acquired
religious conviction who now seeks the statutory remedy.
Secondly, in a contested dissolution proceeding and absent a
waiver, the statute requires a sworn statement only from the party
who commences the action." 2 A defendant who does not file a coun-
terclaim is under no reciprocal obligation to either remove any barri-
ers to the plaintiff's remarriage or file a statement that he or she has
done so. Thus, if a wife sues for dissolution and her husband does not
file a counterclaim, the statute will not prevent entry of the final judg-
ment even where the husband refuses to give the wife a get. 3
Conversely, because the statute requires statements from both
parties only in an uncontested action," 4 a spiteful husband is now
107. 122 Misc. 2d at 672, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
108. Id., 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 674, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
111. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
112. Id. § 253(2)-(3).
113. See Warmflash, supra note 3, at 253.
114. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
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able to prevent a civil divorce simply by not contesting the divorce or
by filing a counterclaim and thereafter refusing to file a removal of
barriers statement or a statement of waiver.' 15 Although it is the wife
who is the ultimate beneficiary, the statute appears to be predicated
upon the husband's desire to obtain a valid secular divorce. Thus,
even though the parties may be separated, the husband's willful fail-
ure to comply with the statute will block the entry of a final judgment
of dissolution, possibly relieving his conditional obligation to make
maintenance or child support payments. The parties could fall into a
statutorily created limbo, being divorced by neither state nor church.
All other constitutional arguments aside, these results alone may
cause the statute to be vulnerable to a fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess attack. 1
6
D. Halakhic Validity Of A Statutorily Compelled Get
Finally, the halakhic validity of a get procured under compulsion
of statute is unresolved as well. Although the halakhah appears well-
settled in that a get given under compulsion is invalid,1 7 there is some
authority that such a get might be acceptable. Maimonides offers the
following explanation:
And why is [a compelled] get not null and void, since it is the prod-
uct of duress, whether exerted by heathens or by Israelites? Be-
cause duress applies only to him who is compelled and pressed to
do something which the Torah does not obligate him to do, for
example, one who is lashed until he consents to sell something or
give it away as a gift. On the other hand, he whose evil inclination
induces him to violate a commandment or commit a transgression,
115. In the first case, subdivision four of the statute would block entry of a final judgment
where the husband does not contest the action but refuses to file a statement. In the second
case, the defendant-husband who files a counterclaim would become the plaintiff in the action-
over and therefore might be required to file a statement by subdivision three of the statute. By
refusing to file a statement once the counterclaim is filed, entry of the judgment would be
blocked.
116. One aspect of the original statute which was particularly suspect on due process and
free exercise grounds appears to have been remedied by the 1984 amendments. The original
version of the statute allowed no waiver of its requirements. Thus, since plaintiffs in all New
York divorce actions were required to file statements, the original law may have blocked judg-
ments in both cases where the parties were unconcerned with the statutory remedy and where
the parties were offended by the requirements. The revised statute now permits the statutory
provisions to be waived. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2)-(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
117. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nashim: Tractate Gittin 88b. The gets, however, or-
dered by the secular courts above would not fall within this proscription. In those cases, the
husband had already voluntarily agreed to deliver a get, either expressly, in a separation agree-
ment or other contract, or impliedly, in the ketubah.
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and who is lashed until he does what he is obligated to do ...
cannot be regarded as a victim of duress. . . .Therefore, [once a]
man who refuses to divorce his wife. . . is lashed until his inclina-
tion is weakened and he says "I consent," it is the same as if he had
given the get voluntarily.
1 18
Whether one accepts Maimonides' rationale or not, the validity
of a statutorily compelled get has yet to be tested in a Beth Din. De-
spite its laudable intent, the legislative response may ultimately oper-
ate to invalidate the very goal it sought to achieve.
V. HALAKHIC ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL
OR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
There is no generally accepted halakhic solution to the problem
of the agunah. Indeed, there is even some sentiment among the tradi-
tional rabbinate that the agunah is a necessary evil of the halakhah. 119
However, precisely because the agunah is purely a creation of Jewish
law, the most effective solution to the problem would seem to lie not
in a civil courtroom or state capital, but in the halakhah itself.
Although a complete discussion and critical analysis of possible
halakhic solutions is well beyond the scope of this Comment, several
alternatives are presented to illustrate the fundamental difference be-
tween the halakhic approach to the problem and the limited nature of
the remedies available from secular American judicial and legislative
bodies.
The Reform movement has neatly sidestepped the issue entirely
by deciding that a get is no longer necessary: "[a]t the present time,
the Central Conference of American Rabbis makes no provision for a
religious divorce and civil divorce is recognized as dissolving a mar-
riage by most Reform rabbis."
120
In the Conservative movement, the French rabbinate suggested a
118. M. MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Sefer Nashim: Hilchot Gerushin 2:20, quoted in
I. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 468.
119. When asked to comment on the halakhic validity of Rabbi Louis Epstein's proposed
solution to the problem of the agunah, one rabbi "of great fame" questioned the need for any
solution whatsoever:
When America entered the war, it knew that with war would come widows and
orphans and cripples. Yet in defense of country and national honor they took these
things for granted. Our country and our honor is our Torah; why not take agunot
for granted in our defense of the Torah?
Epstein, A Solution To The Agunah Problem, 4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEM-
BLY OF THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA 83, 88 (1933).
120. AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA 514 (W. Jacob ed. 1983).
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"conditional marriage" as a solution to the problem as early as
1907.121 Under this theory, the religious marriage is deemed retroac-
tively void if a civil divorce is granted to either party, and thus the
wife could not be considered an agunah even absent the delivery of a
get. However, this early French conditional marriage theory was met
with the "united protest" of over four hundred rabbis, and was appar-
ently held in abeyance.
122
The conditional marriage theory was reviewed and raised again
in 1938.123 Although conditional marriages might be possible under
the letter of the halakhah, it was felt that the children of such a mar-
riage would be placed in an "anomalous" position should the condi-
tion ever obtain and the marriage be declared void.1 24
A second suggestion called for the husband to execute a condi-
tional divorce at the time of the marriage to be given effect should the
wife become an agunah.I25 Although this theory was considered
sound under the halakhah, it seemed impractical to require that every
marriage be both a marriage and divorce combined. I2
6
A third proposal would "have the groom appoint an agent at the
time of the marriage to issue a divorce to the wife under the supervi-
sion of a specified court, in the event she becomes an Agunah."' 127
The major objection to this solution was that the husband is required
to speak directly with the scribe and witnesses, and in the event the
scribe and witnesses did not attend every wedding, or were dead or
otherwise unavailable at the time the divorce becomes necessary, the
agency would be "defaulted."' 128
Another solution involved a modification of the agency proposal:
What Epstein proposes is a double marriage ceremony and an in-
121. Epstein, Adjustment Of The Jewish Marriage Laws To Present-Day Conditions, 5 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY OF THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF
AMERICA 227, 231 (1939).
122. Id.
123. Aronson, Dr. Louis M. Epstein's "The Agunah Question," 7 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY OF THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA 301, 303
(1941).
124. Id. Rabbi Aronson raised another objection to conditional marriages: "my strongest
personal objection to such a solution is that it would make every marriage psychologically a
'trial marriage,' and I have serious misgivings regarding the social effects and moral conse-
quences of 'trial marriages.'" Id. at 303-04 (emphasis in original).
125. Epstein, Adjustment Of The Jewish Marriage Laws To Present-Day Conditions, supra
note 121, at 231.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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strument added to the regular Ketubah whereby the husband dele-
gates the woman herself to write his Bill of Divorcement for her,
under certain conditions. The woman is also appointed to become,
upon the completion of the writing of the Get, the husband's mes-
senger to convey the document to another messenger whom she is
authorized to appoint and who would duly deliver the document
back to her in the traditional form as the final act of the divorce
process. 
1 29
This proposal was adopted by the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly
in 1935,130 but was later withdrawn "in the hope that the partisan
passions [against the proposal] of the Orthodox [rabbis] would soon
abate and that they would come to approach the problem in a deliber-
ative and judicial manner as becomes rabbis in Israel."'
13 1
Much later the issue was reconsidered. At the request of the
Conservative Joint Law Conference, Professor Saul Lieberman added
a clause to the traditional marriage ketubah reflecting a private agree-
ment between the bride and groom to authorize the "Beth Din of the
Rabbinical Assembly of America. . . to summon either party at the
request of the other, in order to enable the party so requesting to live
in accordance with the standards of the Jewish Law of Marriage
throughout his or her lifetime."1 32 Such a clause was specifically en-
forced in Avitzur v. Avitzur.1 3
3
The issue has now apparently come full circle in the Conserva-
tive movement:
The latest effort on the part of the Rabbinical Assembly was
in 1968, when the Law Committee adopted an antenuptial agree-
ment signed by the man and the woman in which they agree that if
the marriage should end with a civil divorce, and one of the parties
refuses to agree to the granting of a get, the marriage should retro-
129. Aronson, supra note 123, at 304.
130. Id. at 306. Although first proposed in 1930, the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly
had waited for the Orthodox rabbis to consider the halakhic aspects of the proposal and "take
up seriously the search for some kind of practical solution to the problem." Id. However, the
ensuing response of the Orthodox rabbis was unexpected, at best:
What followed, however, was not a Halakic discussion, not a rabbinic reply, but a
class-struggle. The Union of Orthodox Rabbis of America used this as an opportu-
nity to declare war on the Conservative rabbis as a class[, and]. . . started a cam-
paign of vituperation which would put a fisherwoman to shame.
Id. at 306-07.
131. Id. at 307.
132. I. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 393.
133. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 76 (1983).
See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
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actively become null and void.' 34
Thus, there seems to be no generally accepted halakhic solution
to the problem of the agunah, and the enactment of the get statute in
New York may provide an avenue for rabbinical abdication of the
responsibility for the agunah. Nevertheless a halakhic solution could
strike at the root of the problem and perhaps eliminate it entirely,
while state judicial or legislative solutions are only able to remedy
symptoms on a case-by-case basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
New York has experimented with both judicial and legislative
responses to the problem of the agunah. Judicial efforts seek to com-
pel recalcitrant husbands to fulfill their obligations by resort to secu-
larly enforceable separation agreements or provisions of the marriage
ketubah. Koeppel, its progeny, and Avitzur provide both adequate
precedent for future cases and persuasive guidance for other jurisdic-
tions. In addition, by relying solely upon "neutral principles of con-
tract law," the cases also avoid the excessive governmental
entanglement with religion proscribed by the first amendment.
Nevertheless, the New York legislature attempted to provide an
additional civil remedy to those without an enforceable contract by
enacting Domestic Relations Law section 253, the so-called ' get"
statute. Of questionable constitutional and halakhic validity, hy-
potheticals are easily postulated in which the statute provides no
assistance to the aggrieved party. Although well intended, perhaps
the clearest lesson to be learned from the statute is the problem of the
agunah--essentially a problem of Jewish ecclesiastical law-is best
left to resolution in a halakhic, and not legislative, forum.
Bruce Perelman
134. I. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 498-99.
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APPENDIX A
New York Domestic Relations Law section 253
§ 253. Removal of barriers to remarriage.
1. This section applies only to a marriage solemnized in this state or
in any other jurisdiction by a person specified in subdivision one of
section eleven of this chapter.
2. Any party to a marriage defined in subdivision one of this section
who commences a proceeding to annul the marriage or for a divorce
must allege, in his or her verified complaint: (i) that, to the best of his
or her knowledge, that he or she has taken or that he or she will take,
prior to the entry of final judgment, all steps solely within his or her
power to remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following
the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has waived in
writing the requirements of this subdivision.
3. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter be en-
tered unless the plaintiff shall have filed and served a sworn statement:
(i) that, to the best of his or her knowledge, he or she has, prior to the
entry of such final judgment, taken all steps solely within his or her
power to remove all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following
the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has waived in
writing the requirements of this subdivision.
4. In any action for divorce based on subdivisions five and six of
section one hundred seventy of this chapter in which the defendant
enters a general appearance and does not contest the requested relief,
no final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered unless
both parties shall have filed and served sworn statements: (i) that he
or she has, to the best of his or her knowledge, taken all steps solely
within his or her power to remove all barriers to the other party's
remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the other
party has waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision.
5. The writing attesting to any waiver of the requirements of subdi-
vision two, three or four of this section shall be filed with the court
prior to the entry of a final judgment of annulment or divorce.
6. As used in the sworn statements prescribed by this section "bar-
rier to remarriage" includes, without limitation, any religious or con-
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scientious restraint or inhibition, of which the party required to make
the verified statement is aware, that is imposed on a party to a mar-
riage, under the principles held by the clergyman or minister who has
solemnized the marriage, by reason of the other party's commission
or withholding of any voluntary act. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require any party to consult with any clergyman or min-
ister to determine whether there exists any such religious or conscien-
tious restraint or inhibition. It shall not be deemed a "barrier to
remarriage" within the meaning of this section if the restraint or inhi-
bition cannot be removed by the party's voluntary act. Nor shall it be
deemed a "barrier to remarriage" if the party must incur expenses in
connection with removal of the restraint or inhibition and the other
party refuses to provide reasonable reimbursement for such expenses.
"All steps solely within his or her power" shall not be construed to
include application to a marriage tribunal or other similar organiza-
tion or agency of a religious denomination which has authority to
annul or dissolve a marriage under the rules of such denomination.
7. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered,
notwithstanding the filing of the plaintiff's sworn statement prescribed
by this section, if the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the
marriage certifies, in a sworn statement, that he or she has solemnized
the marriage and that, to his or her knowledge, the plaintiff has failed
to take all steps solely within his or her power to remove all barriers
to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce,
provided that the said clergyman or minister is alive and available and
competent to testify at the time when final judgment would be
entered.
8. Any person who knowingly submits a false sworn statement
under this section shall be guilty of making an apparently sworn false
statement in the first degree and shall be punished in accordance with
section 210.40 of the penal law.
9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court
to inquire into or determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The
truth of any statement submitted pursuant to this section shall not be
the subject of any judicial inquiry, except as provided in subdivision
eight of this section.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
1984]

